

Chapter 6

Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Introduction

Since the negotiation of the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon states parties have sought assurances from the nuclear-weapon states to guarantee their security from nuclear attack because the former states have forgone their right to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

Formal security assurances are not included in the NPT. However, the negotiating parties did agree to include a statement in the last preambular paragraph of the Treaty, which recalls that, in accordance with the UN Charter, 'States must refrain in their international relations from the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State'. Many non-nuclear weapon states considered this statement inadequate to meet their security needs and subsequently tried to obtain more stringent and specific security assurances.

The right to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties is directly incorporated in the NPT. Article VII reaffirms 'the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories'. One means through which legally binding security assurances have been offered by the nuclear-weapon states is through the protocols to NWFZs.

Security assurances and NWFZ developments 1970–75

In 1971 the United States ratified Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This contains the obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty, and commits them to respect the NWFZ and to undertake 'not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America'. China and France ratified this Protocol in 1974. [The United Kingdom had ratified both Protocol I and II in 1969.] In 1971 the Netherlands ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco concerning the maintenance of the NWFZ in the territories for which, *de jure* or *de facto*, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone of the Treaty.

In 1974 Iran and Egypt co-sponsored a proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East, while in the same year Pakistan proposed at the United Nations General Assembly that a NWFZ be established in South Asia (this concept had first been advanced in November 1972).

By 1975 the Treaty of Tlatelolco was in force for 20 states of the 33 eligible to sign it (Barbados, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico [the Depositary State], Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela).

First NPT Review Conference — 1975

Under the Review of Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the Final Declaration of the Conference:

- emphasized the 'particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons';

- noted the 'continued determination of the Depositary States' to honour United Nations Security Council resolution 255(1968);
- considered that the establishment of NWFZ represented 'an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons'; and
- recognized, that to be effective, a NWFZ requires the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon states and urged them to provide 'binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements'.

Security assurance and NWFZ developments 1975–80

In 1976 and 1977 respectively, the Bahamas and Suriname brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, bringing the total number of parties to 22. The former Soviet Union ratified Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1979, thus making all the nuclear-weapon states parties to it.

At the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1) in 1978, China, France, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States all issued unilateral statements on negative security assurances. Each assurance embraced specific qualifications related to each states' nuclear doctrine and security arrangements. Only China issued an unconditional negative security assurance. The Final Document of UNSSOD-1 urged the nuclear-weapon states to 'pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

In 1979 the Committee on Disarmament established an *Ad Hoc Committee* open to all member states to consider 'Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons'. On 27 March 1979 Pakistan submitted a document to this forum entitled 'Conclusion of an International Convention to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapons States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons', which stipulated in Article I that security assurances would be extended to 'non-nuclear-weapon states not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear states'. On 21 June 1979 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and the Soviet Union submitted a working paper entitled 'Draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States' in which:

- Article I stated 'The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties to this Convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space'; and
- Article II stated 'The obligation set forth in article I of this Convention shall extend not only to the territory of non-nuclear States Parties, but also to the armed forces and installations under the jurisdiction and control of

such States wherever they may be, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space’.

On 17 July 1980 Pakistan submitted a working paper entitled ‘Possible draft resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”’. The draft resolution:

- called upon those States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances; and
- urged the Committee on Disarmament to pursue negotiations for this purpose and conclude, without delay, a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

A working paper by Bulgaria was also presented during the same session entitled ‘Forms of the arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons’. This paper divided the security assurance arrangements into three forms:

- unilateral non-use declarations, of which there are two types: individual declarations and identical non-use declarations;
- international conventions with uniform non-use formula; and
- Security Council resolutions, of which there are three types: a Security Council resolution containing a uniform non-use formula or identical declarations; a Security Council resolution containing or referring to the non-use declarations already made; a Security Council resolution taking note only of the individual non-use declarations.

Second NPT Review Conference — 1980

During the Review of Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States the participants agreed a draft report for inclusion in a Final Declaration which:

- recognized that NWFZ, properly constituted, could curb the spread of nuclear weapons and contribute to the security of the states in the region;
- invited the nuclear-weapon states to undertake binding commitments to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states in such zones;
- expressed satisfaction that all five nuclear-weapon states had adhered to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;
- confirmed the continued validity of UN Security Council resolution 255;
- noted that states should have the right to decide if, and under what conditions, the assistance envisaged by resolution 255 might be granted;
- noted the unilateral declarations made by the three depositary states of the NPT at UNSSOD-1; and
- expressed the view that effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would further efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, the Conference failed to reach consensus on the entire Final Declaration.

Security assurances and NWFZ developments 1980–85

In 1981 the Japanese Socialist Party and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea proposed a nuclear-free peace zone in Northeast Asia.

In 1982 the Soviet Union, China and France issued further unilateral statements on negative security assurances at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-2).

In 1983 Antigua and Barbuda ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bringing the number of parties to 23.

In 1981 Sweden proposed to the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons of the CD, that any Convention banning radiological weapons should also prohibit military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. In August 1984, Sweden presented a working paper of proposals for parts of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive materials for hostile purposes, to the Ad Hoc Committee. The paper proposed that the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes causing destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation should be prohibited, irrespective of the method applied. This included attacks on nuclear facilities. The prohibition would encompass four categories of facilities: nuclear reactors; intermediate spent fuel storage sites; reprocessing plants and waste deposits. Thresholds would be established to determine which facilities would be covered by the treaty. The paper also discussed how they might be identified and registered.

On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Forum meeting at Rarotonga endorsed a text of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). It contains restrictions on: the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices; peaceful nuclear activities; nuclear testing; and the dumping of radioactive waste within the area covered by the Zone.

Third NPT Review Conference — 1985

The Final Declaration of the 1985 Conference contained 20 paragraphs concerning its Review of Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The main points were that the Conference:

- emphasized the importance of concluding NWFZ ‘in harmony with internationally recognized principles’, as stated in the UNSSOD-1 Final Document;
- expressed ‘its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly contribute to creating favourable conditions’ for the establishment of NWFZ;
- urged all concerned parties to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East;
- considered that the ‘development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa ... frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime’; and
- called upon all states, ‘particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach [on nuclear security assurances] acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character’.

Security assurances and NWFZ developments 1985–90

On 11 December 1986 the Treaty of Rarotonga entered into force.

In December 1988 India and Pakistan signed an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities

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By 1990 eleven states were party to the Treaty of Rarotonga (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa). China and the Soviet Union had signed Protocol 2, which commits parties to undertake 'not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device' against those adhering to the Treaty, and Protocol 3, which commits parties 'not to test any nuclear explosive anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone'.

In April 1990 Egypt proposed the establishment of a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (ZFWMD) in the Middle East.

On 3 July 1990 OPANAL, the executive body of the Tlatelolco Treaty, approved a resolution which added language to its text making it, the 'Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean'.

Fourth NPT Review Conference — 1990

On 27 April 1990 Egypt submitted a Working Paper encompassing positive security assurances to the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth NPT Review Conference and later to the Conference itself. This Working Paper:

- recommended that the UN Security Council adopt a new resolution (to replace resolution 255) to provide credible and universally acceptable security assurances;
- proposed that a wider definition of 'assistance' should be provided through the new resolution to encompass technical, financial and humanitarian assistance; and
- called for credible sanctions to be imposed against any state that attacked a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT with nuclear weapons.

On 1 June 1990 Nigeria submitted a draft agreement for discussion at the Conference for an international convention on negative security assurances. The draft convention sought a common formula which called for:

- the extension of negative security assurances to all states in the NPT which either did not belong to a nuclear alliance or which belonged to a nuclear alliance but did not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; and
- those states which belonged to a nuclear alliance to undertake not to participate in, or contribute to, a military attack against any nuclear-weapon state or its allies, parties to the NPT, except in self-defence.

Two working papers related to attacks on nuclear facilities were tabled by the Islamic Republic of Iran and by Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden, respectively.

There was no Final Declaration in 1990 so no language on security assurances or NWFZs was adopted by the Conference.

Security assurances and NWFZ developments 1990–95

On 10 October 1990 the Secretary-General of the United Nations published a study on 'Effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East'.

On 19 December 1990 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the 'Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'. Operative paragraph 5 of this resolution contained a recommendation that:

The Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposal designed to secure the same objective.

At the 1991 session of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on 'Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons' Egypt submitted a further Working Paper on security assurances which sought to update and enhance UN Security Council resolution 255. This Working Paper called for the initiation of 'a process whereby nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT would conduct consultations collectively or individually with nuclear-weapon States not currently party to the Treaty on security assurances taking into account United Nations Security Council resolution 255 of 1968...'

On 27 January 1991 the agreement between India and Pakistan not to attack each others' nuclear facilities entered into force.

On 3 April 1991 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 687 which incorporated a paragraph identifying the need to work towards the establishment of a ZFWMD in the Middle East.

On 10 May 1991 OPANAL removed the provision (Article 25.2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco barring membership for states with territorial disputes within the zone. France then ratified Protocol I on 24 August 1992.

In May 1991 a United Nations Group of Experts, in co-operation with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to discuss the terms of an African NWFZ Treaty which had first been advocated during the founding meeting of the OAU in 1964. Subsequent meetings of the group were held in 1992 (Addis Ababa); 1993 (Harare) and 1994 (Windhoek and Addis Ababa).

On 31 December 1991 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea signed a 'Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula'. This was followed on 18 March 1992 by the 'Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee'.

France submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1992 which proposed that security assurances should apply, in the form of an international convention, to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to a legally-binding instrument not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons (such as, parties to the NPT, a regional NWFZ, or states that have concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA). These assurances would be nullified if the non-nuclear-weapon state participates in an aggression against the nuclear-weapon state in alliance or association with another nuclear-weapon state.

In 1992 St. Vincent and the Grenadines ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and in September of that year Cuba stated that it would accede once all states had assumed their responsibilities under it. On 18 January 1994 Argentina and Chile became full parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On 4 March the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina,

Brazil, the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA entered into force upon completion of the ratification procedures. On 30 May Brazil became a full party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by depositing its instruments of ratification of the Treaty amendments and waiving the entry into force provision. Dominica, Belize and Chile also ratified in 1993–4, resulting in the Treaty having 29 parties by early 1995. As a consequence of these decisions, Cuba signed the Treaty in March 1995.

In 1993, the CD did not convene its Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and the issue of prohibiting military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities slipped from the agenda.

On 14 September 1994 Indonesia submitted a letter to the Chair of the Third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference held in Geneva, which transmitted a document prepared by the Group of Non-Aligned and other States on Substantive Issues. The document contained the following two paragraphs on NWFZ:

the nuclear-weapon states should ‘abide and adhere to those international instruments that have established nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to support the initiatives taken by a State or States Parties with a view to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, particularly in the regions of the Middle-East and Africa.

Furthermore, deployments of nuclear weapons by NWSs on foreign territories, particularly in NNWSs territories, should be prohibited as it negates the objectives of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. All States that have deployed nuclear weapons outside their boundaries should withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories’.

The document also contained the following statement on security assurances:

Pending the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, unconditional security assurances to the NNWSs has been regarded as one of the major concerns. In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of States Parties to the NPT to be assured of non use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapon States Parties should agree to a legally binding instrument on this issue before the 1995 Conference. The CD should intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signed an agreement on 21 October 1994 in which (a) the United States provided formal security assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and (b) the DPRK agreed to take steps to implement the North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

At the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), held on 5 December 1994, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom issued a Joint Declaration containing a Memorandum on Security Assurances for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in connection with all three states’ accession to the NPT. On the same day France made a unilateral declaration containing formal security assurances to Ukraine.

In February 1995 China gave security guarantees to Kazakhstan. These committed it not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Kazakhstan, and called upon other nuclear weapons states to give similar assurances ‘so as to enhance the security of all non-nuclear-weapon states, including Kazakhstan’.

On 6 April 1995, shortly before the opening of the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, China and France addressed individual letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, annexing the contents of the unilateral declarations on security assurances each had issued the previous day to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The United Kingdom did the same in reference to its declaration of 6 April 1995 on this subject. The letter from China repeated that country’s no-first-use pledge and referred to ‘complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons’. On the same day, the Russian Federation transmitted a similar letter to the Secretary-General annexing the contents of two statements on security assurances made by a representative of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 April 1995. The second of these statements affirmed Russia’s intention not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT, unless such a state or states were to mount an attack in association with a nuclear-weapon state on Russian territory, forces, allies or states towards which it has a security commitment. The United States also addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that day annexing the contents of a statement by its Secretary of State regarding a declaration by its President on security assurances.

On 11 April 1995 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 984 on security assurances, sponsored by the five nuclear-weapon states.

Fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference — 1995

Among the decisions taken by the NPT Conference in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995 was one on *Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*. This reiterated that the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones ‘especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of the each region’, and indicated that the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones ‘by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome’. It also stated that ‘The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and their relevant protocols’.

In the field of security assurances the decision stated that ‘further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons’ and that these ‘could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument’.

The Conference also adopted a ‘Resolution on the Middle East’ sponsored by Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. In this, the states in the Middle East are called upon by the Conference ‘to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter*

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alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective’.

As there was no Final Declaration in 1995, no consensus language on security assurances or NWFZs was adopted by the Conference in that context.

Security Assurances and NWFZ developments 1995–2000

Between 29 May and 2 June 1995, the final draft of the Pelindaba Treaty, the document creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, was agreed in Johannesburg and Pelindaba, South Africa. It was endorsed by African Heads of State meeting in Addis Ababa later in June.

On 12 December 1995 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution introduced by Egypt that urged Middle Eastern countries to join the NPT and establish a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone.

On 15 December 1995 the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty was signed in Bangkok by leaders of the then seven ASEAN nations, as well as the other three states in the region. Article 1 of the Treaty defined the Zone as comprising the territories of all states in Southeast Asia and their respective continental shelves and exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Through a Protocol to the Treaty, the five nuclear-weapon states could commit themselves not to violate the Treaty and to provide negative security assurances to the States Parties. After the signing ceremony some of the nuclear-weapon states expressed reservations about restrictions on freedom of navigation and certain other matters that they believed were inherent in the Treaty text. The treaty entered into force on 27 March 1997.

In February 1996 Australia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free area in the Southern Hemisphere. His proposal was to link the NWFZ created in the South Pacific, Latin America and Africa by the Treaties of Rarotonga, Tlatelolco and Pelindaba respectively, so as to create a ‘super nuclear-weapon-free zone’.

On 25 March 1996, France, the United Kingdom and the United States joined China and the Russian Federation as signatories of the three protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. These were ratified by the United Kingdom on 19 September 1997.

On 11 April 1996 the Pelindaba Treaty was opened for signature by the 53 states of the OAU at a ceremony in Cairo. Entry into force will occur when it has been ratified by 28 states. Article 1 of the Treaty defines the zone as ‘the territory of the continent of Africa, islands States members of OAU and all islands considered by the Organisation of African Unity in its resolutions to be part of Africa’. The zone encompasses the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and associated air space and sea bed only. Protocol I of the Treaty contains negative security assurances from the five nuclear weapons states, while Protocol II bans them from testing or promoting the testing of nuclear explosives in the zone. China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States signed these protocols at the time of the opening ceremony in Cairo. Russia attended the signing ceremony but did not sign until

the following month. It cited the presence of a US military base on the island of Diego Garcia as the cause of the delay. Protocol III, covering territories within the zone for which non-African states have responsibility, was signed by France but not by Spain.

In July 1999 China announced that it would sign the Protocol to the South East Asia NWFZ.

Sixth NPT Review Conference — 2000

The 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference included the following text in the ‘Chairman’s Working Paper’ under the heading ‘nuclear-weapon-free zones’:

Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies.

The 1997 ‘Chairman’s Working Paper’ included the following text under the heading ‘security assurances’:

Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The 1998 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference included the following text in the ‘Chairman’s Working Paper’ (which was not formally adopted by the PrepCom) under the heading ‘nuclear-weapon-free zones’:

Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirm the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

The States parties express support for measures taken by States to establish internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. They also support proposals for these zones in parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies.

The 1998 ‘Chairman’s Working Paper’ included identical text to that in the 1997 paper under the heading ‘security assurances’.

The Chairman produced two Working Papers at the 1999 session of the Preparatory Committee (neither of which were adopted by the PrepCom). The second Chairman’s Working Paper dated 20 May contained the following text under the heading “Nuclear-weapon-free zones”:

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26. Welcome and support of the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the states concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

27. Support of proposals for the establishment of NWFZ where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia and welcome of the initiative taken by states in Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

28. Welcome the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapon on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation.

29. Welcome the conclusion of the agreement regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and urge its rapid implementation.

30. Recognition of the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons

31. Reaffirmation of the importance of ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as of the continued work by all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so.

32. Welcome the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free zone in the Middle

East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Urge all States directly concerned to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

33. Welcome the report on the 'Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned', adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 of April 1999.

This also contained the following text under the heading "Security Assurances".

40. Reaffirmation that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security on non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded.

41. Welcome the establishment in March 1998 in the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and urge its immediate reestablishment.

42. Reiterate the need for the commitment, without any condition, by all the nuclear weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and conclude international legal instruments to this effect.

The full texts of the PrepCom papers quoted here are reproduced in Volume II of the *Briefing Book*.